INTRODUCTION
The primary purpose of tfds report is to document a Defense-in-Depth (DID) accident analysis evahration for Department of Energy (DOE) Savannah River Site (SRS) Tritium Facility Buildings 232-H,233-H, and234-H. Thepurpose ofa DIDevakration isto provide a more realistic view of facility radiological risks to the offsite public than the bounding deterministic analysis documented in the Safety Analysis Report, which credits only Stiet y Class items in the offsite dose evaluation.
The DID evaluation is performed in accordance with Authorization Basis (AB) Guidance Document 301-01.
The work documented in this report focuses on the draft SAR documented in Reference 1. The fictional classification of these SRSTritim Facili~btildings iscontainedin Reference 2.
The DIDassessment isateam effort. Thepreparer of thereport isamember of theteam, who acted as a facilitator for the team meetings.
The Tritimn DID evaluation specified by the procedure implementing AB Guidance Document 301-01. The Phase Icredits tie following: (l) SCitems, (2) SSitems, ad (3) best-estimate analysis factors. The Phase IIcredits the following: (l) SCitems, (2)SS items, (3) HA items, and (4) best-estimate analysis factors.
Additional supporting information is contained in Reference 3.
ACCIDENTS AND EQUIPMENT
The first column of Table 1 , Offsite SC Results, lists the accidents for which quantitative accident analyses are documented in the Tritium SAR (Reference 1). In Table 1 , these accidents are grouped by accident type. Table 4 lists Safety Class (SC) and Safety Significant (SS) Systems, Structures, and Components (SSCS) credited in the hazard analysis and in the accident anafysis for each of the events listed in Table 1 . Table 4 also lists potential defense-in-depth items (BOLD underline) for each of the accidents listed in Table 1 . (The information listed in Table 4 includes administrative controls in addition to SSCS.) The information in Table 4 is adapted from References 1 and 2.
The DID accident amdysis evacuation involves an assessment by a team to (1) select DID items to reduce offsite doses and (2) develop dose reduction factors for each selected item, based on qualitative reasoning.
WSRC-TR-99-OO079 # 3 fl"T able 1 summarize the results of the SAR accident analysis (i.e., these are the pre-DlDevaluation starting points for the DID evaluation). The corresponding DID dose evaluation goals (EG) are also listed in Table 1 . The estimated doses results by considering Safety Class (SC) items, and Best Estimate (BE) analysis for all three cases are in Table 1 . There is no change in tie frequencies of the scenario because the contribution of the SC items is already considered in the SAR analysis. The estimated high, medium and low doses are all below the DID evaluation goals (EG) (Ref. 3 ).
The medium doses calculated by considering SC items and BE methodology are below the DID EG as required by the AD guidance document 301-01.
The estimated doses results by considering Safety Significant (SS) items, SC items, and BE analysis for all three cases are in Table 2 , Offsite SS Results. There is a change in the frequencies of some scenario as compared to the values in the SAR when the realistic contribution of the SS items is considered. The SS items/programs that reduce the frequency of a scenario are shown in Table 4 (in BOLD letters). The estimated high, medium and low doses are all below the DID evaluation goals (EG) (Ref. 3 ).
The medium doses calculated by considering SS items, SC items and BE methodology are below the DID EG as required by the AB guidance document301 -01.
The estimated doses results by considering Hazard Analysis (HA) items, SS items, SC items, and BE analysis for all three cases are in Table 3 , Offsite HA Results. There is a change in the frequencies of some scenario as compared to the values calculated by SS and SC items when the rerdistic contribution of the HA items is considered. The HA items/programs that reduce the frequency of a scenario are shown in Table 4 (in BOLD letters). The estimated high, medium and low doses are all below the DID evaluation goals (EG) @cf. 3).
DEFENSE-IN-DEPTH EVALUATIONS
The DID methodology is partly qualitative and relies on judgement to a certain extent.
This section contains a subsection summarizing the DID evaluation for each of the events in the SAR, with two exceptions. The exceptions are (1) the Building 234-H tire scenario that releases only mercury vapor (which is not a significant radiological release event) and (2) the 217-H explosion scenario (the SAR contains an evaluation of possible scenarios, but concludes that none of them are credible).
Each of the following DID evaluation subsections contains a brief description of the event scenarios. These scenarios were adapted (condensed) from descriptions in Reference 1. The following paragraphs are generic descriptive material that has also been adapted from Reference 1.
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Fires were identified in all three frequency bins for building 232-H. The anticipated fires were postulated to be hood fires, ventilation system fires, and a control room fire. The hood fire applies to any hood in the building, including the Zeolite bed recovery hood, MTF hoods, and process hold tank hoods. The unlikely fires included single room fires, multi-room zone fires, mdti-zone tires, and full area fires. The extremely unlikely tire is represented by a full building fire.
Fires were identified in all three frequency bins for building 234-H. The anticipated tires were postulated to be hood fires or a tire in 217-H vault involving invento~in one HIVES. The hood fire applies to any hood in the building, including both the hoods in the finishing areas and the hoods in the currently unused process areas. The unlikely fires include hood fires, single room fires, multi-room zone fires, and multi-zone fires. The extremely unlikely tires are represented by a fire in the 2 17-H vault. It has been shown that tires which propagate through the walls separating the 217-H vault from the rest of 234-H are beyond extremely ordikely events so long as the planned fire protection upgrades are completed.
Building 232-H is used for isotopic separation and purification of hydrogen isotopes and contains equipment for processing significant quantities of hydrogen gas. Two types of explosion events are analyzed for Building 232-H; pressurized process tank deflagration and process tank internal detonation. Pressurized process tank deflagration and Process tank internal detonation accidents are in the Unlikely and Extremely Unlikely frequency bin, respectively, It should be noted that for all of the deflagration and detonation scenarios for building 232-H, a 3-atmosphere pressure limit has been assumed at the request of the facility. The intended effect of limiting the peak operating pressure is to reduce the likelihood of a detonation if a flammable mixture is ignited inside a tank. Although tils assumption is partially responsible for moving the detonation accident from the Unlikely frequency bin to the Extremely Unlikely frequency bin, the 3 atmosphere limit is not necessary for meeting the evaluation guidelines since the detonation consequences are below the Unlikely guideline.
The accident selection process identified process related deflagrations and explosions as significant hazards for building 233-H. The explosion events in all three frequency bins are anal yzed. They are: Loading Line deflagration in Anticipated category; Explosion in Environmental Conditioning area in Unlikely category, and Internal Mix Tank deflagration in Extremely Unlikely category.
The process tanks and piping in building 234-H have been blanked off and contain no more than 100 g of tritimn contamination. The contamination is assumed to be distributed throughout the system so that the generation of flammable concentrations of hydrogen isotopes and air is not possible. The only other source of tritiurn is the reservoirs stored throughout building 234-H. The accident selection process identified process related deflagrations and explosions as significant hazards for building 234-H. The following two explosion events bound all the explosion events identified in the HA:
WSRC-TR-99-OO079~< Loss of confinement accidents identified in the accident selection process can be grouped into six accident types, leaks from process pipes and tanks, leaks from tilled resemoirs, leaks from Zeolite beds, leaks from Zeolite bed recove~systems, contaminated pump oil spills, and contaminated mercury spills. Loss of confinement events are prerequisites for the explosion events discussed above. Thus, loss of cofilnement events discussed in this section do not include subsequent ignition, since that would place the accident in the explosion category.
Based on Tritium Data Bank information regarding reservoir releases and process leaks, loss of confinement accidents are anticipated events. The source terms associated with the events contained in the Tritium Data Bank were all relatively small. Loss of confinement events with large source terms require mdtiple failures and are expected to be unlikely events. The consequence associated with an elemental release of tritiurn is relative] y benign, however, compared to a similar release of tritium oxide. Thus, process and reservoir leak loss of cotilnement events can be easily and conservatively bounded by non-mechanistic, large releases of elemental tritium without restricting facility operations.
A spill of tritiated water from a Zeolite bed, tritiated mercury, or tritiated pump oil, however, may lead to a direct release of tritimn oxide. As stated in the frequency quantification talc-note, tritiated water releases from Zeolite beds are anticipated events. Unless a Zeolite bed is heated, as in Zeolite bed recovery operations, very little tritium oxide is released when a Zeolite bed container is breached. The simple room-temperature breach of a Zeolite bed will be bounded by a loss of Zeolite bed confinement during recovery operations.
Bnilding 232-H Hood Fire

Accident Description
The worst hood fire in the anticipated kequency bin has been determined to place no more than 1.0 kg of tritiurn at risk. While more than 1.0 kg of tritiurn could be placed in a hood, the frequency of a tire in any specific hood (or any seven specific hoods) is in the Ufllkely bin.
Defense-in-Depth Evaluation
The DID evaluation of this accident scenario is documented in Tables 1,2 In the above Unlikely scenario, the operation of the tire detection and suppression systems, facility worker training, and fire department response were credited to tie level of reliability used to determine the tire frequency.
The DID evaluation of this accident scenario is documented in Tables 1,2 , and 3. The SAR amdysis for tis event does not meet the DID EG. This event meets the DID EG by crediting the SC items and BE analysis as shown in Table 1 . Lower dose values are calculated (and are listed in Tables 2 and 3 ) by crediting more realistic accident phenomena characteristics in addition to the SS and HA systems. The calculated medium dose is below tie DID EG.
3.3
Bnilding 232-H Full Facility Fire
Accident Description
This scenario starts in the Zone 232-H-101 c, as in the unlikely tire scenario described above. It propagates to fire Zone 232-H-1 OId, then to fire Zone 232-H-101 e and finally to 232-H-10lb (MTF). Process hoods are expected to topple or collapse, damaging equipment and piping and releasing process gas. Z-beds containing tritimn oxide will likely release all their inventory as they are heated. The rooms and building structures will be at elevated temperatures for an extended period of time, since concrete will release absorbed heat long after the fire dies out. The entire tritimn invento~in the building is at risk.
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Defense-in-Depth Evaluation
The DID evaluation of this accident scenario is documented in Tables 1,2 , and 3. The SAR analysis for this event meets the DID EG. Lower dose values are calculated (and are listed in Tables 1,2 , and 3) by crediting more realistic accident phenomena characteristics in addition to the S S and HA systems. The calculated medium dose is below the DID EG.
3.4
Building 233-H Room Fire
Accident Description
The anticipated tires are incipient fires which can be put out with a hand held tire extinguisher and are limited to the room of origin. Reservoirs may be randomly distributed throughout the facility and the risk associated with an incipient fire will be less than guidelines.
Defense-in-Depth Evalrration
The DID evaluation of this accident scenario is documented in Tables 1,2 , and 3. The SAR analysis for this event meets the DID EG. Lower dose values are calcdated (and are listed in Tables 1,2 , and 3) by credhing more realistic accident phenomena characteristics in addition to the S S and HA systems. The calculated medium dose is below the DID EG.
Bnilding 233-H Mrrltiple Room/Fire Area Fire
Accident Description
The bounding unlikely tire in Building 233-His a fire area fire. The fire may start in the electrical equipment, wiring, or from random combustible materiaL In order for the tire to progress to an area fire, facility personnel must fail to detect tie fire before it has progressed beyond the incipient stage and the sprinkler system must fail to control the fire to the room of origin.
Defense-in-Depth Evaluation
The DID evaluation of this accident scenario is documented in Tables 1,2 , and 3.. The SAR analysis for this event does not meet the DID EG. This event meets the DID EG by crediting the SC items and BE analysis as shown in Table 1 . Lower dose values are calculated (and are listed in Tables 2 and 3 ) by crediting more realistic accident phenomena characteristics in addition to the SS and HA systems. The calculated medium dose is below the DID EG.
3.6
Building 233-H Futl Facility Fire
Accident Description
The bounding extremely unlikely fire for buildlng 233-His a full facility fire. The fire is similar to tie unlikely tire described above but the fire department is not able to prevent the fire from crossing the room 11 wall. The tire spreads into the second fire zone and places the remainder of the building inventory at risk.
Defense-in-Depth Evaluation
The DID evaluation of this accident scenario is documented in Tables 1,2 , and 3.. The SAR analysis for this event does not meet the DID EG. This event meets the DID EG by crediting the SC items and BE analysis as shown in Table 1 . Lower dose values are calculated (and are listed in Tables 2 and 3 ) by credhing more realistic accident phenomena characteristics in addition to the SS and HA systems. The calculated medium dose is below the DID EG.
Building 234-H Hood Fire Releasing Tritium
Accident Description
Buildlng 234-H hoods in which tritium is allowed maybe in any of several rooms associated with the tinishlng operations conducted in 234-H. The tires are incipient tires which are limited to the room of ongin and are small enough to be put out with a hand held tire extinguisher. The incipient fire wodd not only have to compromise the cofilnement systems but also convert the escaping tritium to tritium oxide. It is not likely that an incipient tire will oxidize rdl of the escaping tritimn but the release is clearly bounded by 100°/0 oxidation of the entire inventory within the affected hood.
Defense-in-Depth Evaluation
The DID evaluation of tils accident scenario is documented in Tables 1,2 , and 3. The SAR analysis for this event does not meet the DID EG. This event meets the DID EG by crediting the SC items md BE analysis as shown in Table 1 . Lower dose values are calculated (and are listed in Tables 2 and 3 ) by crediting more realistic accident phenomena characteristics in addition to the SS and HA systems. The calculated medium dose is below the DID EG. 
3.9
Buildlng 234-H Fire Area Fire
Accident Description
The representative bounding tire in Building 234-H for the unlikely frequency bin is a full area tire in fire area 234-101. A fire is assumed to start in Zone 234-H-101a from a short in the electrical system. The propagation of the fire to the 217-H vault is stopped by the tire wall. All of the tritium in loose reservoirs within 234-His at risk. In addition, the full area fire is considerably more severe than the test tire for the DOT certified class B shipping containers so the tritimn in reservoirs within those containers is also at risk. It is estimated that the tire requires at least thirty three minutes to compromise all of the reservoirs in the various rooms witiln 234-H.
Defense-in-Depth Evaluation
The DID evaluation of this accident scenario is documented in Tables 1,2 , and 3. The SAR analysis for tils event does not meet the DID EG. This event meets the DID EG by crediting the SC items and BE analysis as shown in Table 1 . Lower dose values are calcdated (and are listed in Tables 2 and 3 ) by crediting more realistic accident phenomena characteristics in addition to the SS and HA systems. The calculated medium dose is below the DID EG.
Building 234-H 217-H Vault Fire (One HIVES)
Accident Description
The representative bounding anticipated fire in 21 7-H vault is a small, non-propagating tire. This scenario assumes that a fire could be initiated by welding activity, electrical equipment, flammable chemicals and gases, or general combustibles. Based on the design information (Ref. 1), current reservoir designs can withs~d temperatures of 400 "F or greater. The analysis in Reference 1 specifies the combustible loading for which the reservoirs will not be compromised in a fire. Therefore, a tire in the Vadt 2 17-H will not result in a release.
3.11
Building 234-HfVault 217-H Large Fire WSRC-TR-99-OO079 H 10 m3
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Accident Description
A tire in the 217-H vault is the bounding extremely unlikely fire for building 234-H. This scenario assumes that sufficient transient combustibles have been brought into the 217-H vault. The transient combustibles ignite and are not controlled by either direct personnel intervention or activation of the sprinkler system. The concrete tire barriers, however, successfully prevent the spread of the fire into the rest of Building 234-H. With the vault door closed and the ventilation system off, significant holdup of the hot gases would occur. Since the transient combustibles should be fairly limited, the duration and severity of the tire should be limited. All of the stored reservoirs (HIVES) would withstand 400"F without releasing any material because of their design and certain restrictions on the length of time since they were tilled. HSVS are also expected to be stored in the HIVES in Vault 217-H but are not expected to release any tritium in the low severity tire postulated here since high temperatures are required to desorb tritinrn from an HSV. Therefore, a fire in the vault 217-h will not result in a release.
Building 232-H Pressurized Process Tank Internal Deflagration
Accident Description
A number of product hold tanks of various sizes are located in Process Lines I and IL The largest of these is tank 246B which has a volume of 2500L. Assuming that a 3 atmosphere pressure limit continues to be protected by rupture disks, the maximum amount of tritinm that could be contained within tank 246B at room temperature (i.e., 298 K) is 307 moles (3*2500/0.082/298=306.7). Under normal operation, this tank should never contain a flammable mixture of hydrogen and air. If, however, a transfer is being made to tank 246B and a leak develops on the suction side of the pomp, air codd be pumped into the tank along with hydrogen isotopes. If the operator does not detect this condition, an air leak of stilcient size to result in a flammable mixture of hydrogen isotopes and air within Tank 246B is possible. Assuming that an ignition source is available, the mixture could deflagrate, leading to high temperature reaction products and a sharp pressure rise inside the tank. Although the worst case pressure increase in the tank would result from a stoichiometric mixture of hydrogen and air, the 3 atmosphere pressure limit prevents the pressure increase from a stoichiometric deflagration from failing the process tank and piping. The largest source term, however, may result from the deflagration of a hyperstoichiometric mixture which does not burn all of the tritium in the tank but continues to oxidize tritiurn as the tank contents are vented into the hood. The bounding source term msociated with a deflagration is postulated to result from a hyperstoichiometric deflagration within the tank which then blows down through the original leak in the pump. The unburned reactants and the hot product gases mix with the air in the hood and continue to oxidize. The rupture d]sk is conservatively assumed not to function so that the entire blowdown is released to the hood.
.12.2 Defense-in-Depth Evaluation
The DID evaluation of this accident scenario is documented in Tables 1,2 , and 3. The SAR analysis for this event does not meet the DID EG. This event meets the DID EG by crediting the SC items and BE analysis as shown in Table 1 . Lower dose values are calculated (and are listed in Tables 2 and 3 ) by crediting more realistic accident phenomena characteristics in addition to the SS and HA systems. The calculated medium dose is below the DID EG.
3.13
Buildlng 232-H Process Tank Internal Detonation 3.13.1 Accident Descriptioñ ls event is similar to the process tank internal deflagration accident except that the pressure generated by the detonation will be significantly higher than that generated by the deflagration. Most of the tanks in 232-H were designed to 150 psi (10 atmospheres) so the maximum initial pressure of 3 atmospheres puts the 232-H process tanks at risk of failure in a detonation event. The likelihood of a detonation in a flammable mixture increases as the mixture approaches stoichiometric concentrations and typically is only considered to occur for hydrogerr/air mixtures between 180/0and 600/0 hydrogen, although detonations in mixtures which were less than 18% hydrogen have also occurred. Given that the detonation may catastrophically fail the tank in which it occurs, shrapnel maybe spread through the process area and compromise additional tanks and potentially create additional ignition hazards.
Defense-in-Depth Evaluation
The DID evahration of this accident scenario is documented in Tables 1,2 , and 3. The SAR analysis for this event meets the DID EG. Lower dose vahres are calculated (and are listed in Tables 1,2 , and 3) by crediting more realistic accident phenomena characteristics in addition to the SS and HA systems. The calculated medium dose is below the DID EG.
3.14
Building 233-H Loading Line Deflagration
Accident Description
An explosion accident related to loading line operations is in the Anticipated frequency bin when the existing controls and equipment (especially the nitrogen glovebox atmosphere) for 233-H loadlng lines are neglected. While the 233-H event only affected a single reservoir during welding, other ignition sources exist in the 233-H gloveboxes and an undetected leak or a misaligned valve could release a significant amount of tritium into the glovebox. At various times during the loading sequence, the loading manifold may be connected to mix tank through a bypass valve on the compressor. Thus, an undetected leak could result in the blowdowrr of a full mix tank to atmospheric pressure.
Defense-in-Depth Evaluation
The DID evaluation of this accident scenario is documented in Tables 1,2 , and 3. The SAR analysis for this event does not meet the DID EG.~ls event meets the DID EG by crediting the SC items and BE analysis as shown in Table 1 . Lower dose values are calcdated (and are listed in Tables 2 and 3 ) by crediting more realistic accident phenomena characteristics in addition to the SS and HA systems. The calculated medium dose is below the DID EG.
Building 233-H Explosion in Environmental Conditioning Area
Accident Description
An explosion accident in Environmental Conditioning Area is in the Unlikely frequency bin. A worker error, improper maintenance, or a material or structural failure of a reservoir could initiate a tritium leak. The leaked tritiom is subsequently ignited and released as tritiom oxide. Although the reservoirs are generally quite robust, the durability of reservoirs outside of normal operating conditions is not currently available and any reservoirs in the room are conservatively assumed to fail when subjected to the explosion environment.
Defense-in-Depth Evaluation
The DID evaluation of this accident scenario is documented in Tables 1,2 , and 3. The SAR analysis for tils event meets the DID EG. Lower dose values are calculated (and are listed in Tables 1,2 , and 3) by crediting more realistic accident phenomena characteristics in addition to the SS and HA systems. The calculated medium dose is below the DID EG.
Building 233-H Internal MIX Tank Deflagration
Accident Description
The deflagration event for buiidlng 233-H is an internal tank deflagration in the largest process tank, Mix Tank G. Since the mix tank is confined within a glovebox with a recirculating nitrogen atmosphere, the most likely deflagration occurs during open glovebox maintenance. Due to human errors during open glovebox maintenance, a mechanical breach of a process tank or the valve separating the tank from the manifold goes undetected and allows air to leak into the subatmospheric mix tank and forma flammable hydrogerr/air mixture. The leak is conservatively assumed to occur in the largest mix tank in 233-H and an ignition source is assumed to ignite the mixture at the upper flammability limit. The peak deflagration pressure is well below the design pressure of the mix tanks so catastrophic failure of the tanks is not a concern. The tank pressure increases due to the deflagration and the product and unburned reactant gases expand back out into the room until the tank and room pressures are in equilibrium. As the hot gases expand into the room, the excess hydrogen isotopes mix with the room air and may form a secondary flammable region. Given the presence of hot combustion products, the second~flammable regions me assumed to ignite and create additional tritinm oxide. Rather than perfom a complex analysis to determine tie maximum amount of tritium oxide created from a particular set of initial condhions, a simplified bounding analysis will be used to determine the source term. The peak composition for a hyper-stoichiometric deflagration at initial conditions of room temperature and 1 atmosphere pressure was determined to be approximate y 78°/0 hydrogen isotopes-air.
Defense-in-Depth Evaluation
The DID evaluation of tils accident scenario is documented in Tables 1,2 , and 3. The SAR analysis for this event meets the DID EG. Lower dose values are calculated (and are listed in Tables 1,2 , and 3) by crediting more realistic accident phenomena characteristics in addition to the SS and HA systems. The calculated medium dose is below the DID EG.
Building 234-H Explosive Discharge of a Reservoir
Accident Description
The process tanks and piping in Building 234-H have been blanked off and contain no more than 100 g of tritinm contamination. The ordy other source of tritium is the reservoirs stored throughout Building 234-H. The explosion is caused by the operator error or explosive actuators (squib valves and explosive neutron generators).
Defense-in-Depth Evaluation
The DID evaluation of this accident scenario is documented in Tables 1,2 , and 3. The SAR analysis for this event meets the DID EG. Lower dose values are calculated (and are listed in Tables 1,2 , and 3) by crediting more realistic accident phenomena characteristics in addition to the S S and HA systems. The calculated medium dose is below the DID EG. 
Building 234-H Failure and Oxidation of Reservoirs
Accident Description
The principal explosion hazard in Building 234-H involves failure of reservoirs caused by the overturning of a cart loaded with reservoirs. This event is similar to a loss of confinement accident with the addition of an ignition source being present. Although an extremely bounding assumption, the ignition source will be assumed to be present when the tritium is released horn the reservoirs. The released gas is assumed to ignite and filly oxidize before the concentrations drop below the lower flammability limit
Defense-in-Depth Evaluation
The DID evaluation of this accident scenario is documented in Tables 1,2 , and 3. The SAR analysis for this event does not meet the DID EG.~ls event meets the DID EG by crediting the SC items and BE analysis as shown in Table 1 . Lower dose values are calculated (and are listed in Tables 2 and 3 ) by crediting more realistic accident phenomena characteristics in addition to the SS and HA systems. The calculated medlunr dose is below the DID EG.
Building 232-H Pressurized Process Tank Leak
Accident Description
For building 232-H, any loss of cotilnement event which releases elemental tritium, such as a process or reservoir leak, can be bounded by a total release of the process inventory as elemental tritiurn. The tritium inventory on Zeolite beds is not at risk for this accident since heat well in excess of that given off by tritium decay is required to drive significant amounts of tritium oxide off of the Zeolite beds. The inventory in reservoirs in MTF is also not included in the bounding release source term since it is physically separated from the process lines by the office areas of building 232-H, the total inventory is less than that of the process lines, and multiple independent failnres are not likely.
Defense-in-Depth Evaluation
The DID evaluation of tils accident scenario is documented in Tables 1,2 , and 3. The SAR analysis for this event meets the DID EG. Lower dose values are calculated (and are listed in Tables 1,2 , and 3) by crediting more realistic accident phenomenã characteristics in addition to the SS and HA systems. The calculated medium dose is below the DID EG.
Building 232-H Mercury Spill
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Accident Description
Tritiated mercury is stored in a 35 gallon stainless steel tank in room 164 of Building 232-H. Spills are anticipated occurrences and result in pools and droplets of mercury. The radiological source term from a spill of tritiated mercury is bounded by 2.0 Ci of tritium oxide and is thus, negligible.
Defense-in-Depth Evaluation
The DID evaluation of tils accident scenario is documented in Tables 1,2 , and 3. The SAR analysis for this event meets the DID EG. Lower dose values are crdculated (and are listed in Tables 1,2 , and 3) by crediting more realistic accident phenomena characteristics in addition to the SS and HA systems. The calculated medium dose is below the DID EG.
3.21
Building 232-H Z-bed recovery system leak
Accident Description
Two Zeolite bed recovery loops are available and maybe run simultaneously. The Zeolite beds are placed in furnaces and heated (250"C) to drive off the adsorbed tritimn oxide. The tritium oxide vapor then circulates through a heated magnesium bed which "cracks" the oxide to create elemental tritimn and magnesium oxide. The recirculating gas stream is periodically vented to recovery tanks to relieve pressure in the recovery train and allow for mass spectrometer analysis. It is possible for both tiaces to connect to the same recovery loop. Thus, the postdated bounding accident is a leak upstream of the magnesium bed which allows tritiurn oxide from two heated Zeolite beds to escape the recovery system before passing through the magnesium bed. Part of the gas stream would still pass through the magnesium bed and only some fraction of the tritimn oxide would be released to the hood. Rather than analyze the fluid flow in tie recovery system to determine what fraction of the gas stream is released during recovery operations, a bounding source term was derived assuming that two 6 inch diameter Zeolite beds, at maximum historical loading, are being recovered using a single magnesium bed.
Defense-in-Depth Evaluation q
The DID evaluation of this accident scenario is documented in Tables 1,2 , and 3. The SAR analysis for this event meets the DID EG. Lower dose values are calcdated (and are listed in Tables 1, 2 , and 3) by crediting more realistic accident phenomena characteristics in addition to the SS and HA systems. The calculated medium dose is below the DID EG.
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Accident Description
For building 233-H, any loss of confinement event which releases elemental tritium from a process kmk or line, can be bounded by a total release of the invento~present in the largest process tank (2000 liter). The leak can be caused by worker error or mechanical failure (i.e., maintenance system) of components in the line or tank. The tritium invento~on Zeolite beds is not at risk for this accident since a significant amount of heat is required to drive the rafier small tritium inventory off of the Zeolite beds. The inventory in reservoirs is also not included in the bounding release source term since it is physically separated from the process lines, represents a smaller quantity of tritiurn, and multiple independent failures must occur to release a significant amount of the reservoir inventory.
Defense-in-Depth Evaluation
The DID evaluation of this accident scenario is documented in Tables 1,2 , and 3. The SAR analysis for this event meets the DID EG. Lower dose values are calculated (and are listed in Tables 1,2 , and 3) by crediting more realistic accident phenomena characteristics in addition to the SS and HA systems. The calculated medium dose is below the DID EG. Based on the recommendation of the DID analysis Team, the following DID item is added: q 233-H Glovebox Stripper System. The functioning of this system would preserve Tritiurn -the National Resource and minimize the tritium concentration in the gloveboxes and tkus would minimize worker exposure during abnormal operations.
Building 234-H Stripper System Leak
Accident Description
The vast majority of the inventory in building 234-His contained in reservoirs. A small amount of tritiurn associated with the 100 g of contamination in the former process areas codd also be in the stripper system. The former process areas of 234-H are also used for storage of deactivated pumps which contain residual amounts of tritiated merc~. The following bounding Anticipated loss of confinement event, stripper system leak, is analyzed for building 234-H.
For building 234-H, any loss of cotilnement event which releases tritimn from inactive process systems, can be bounded by a release from stripper system. The leak can be caused by worker error, improper maintenance, or failure (i.e., material or structured) of stripper system.
Defense-in-Depth Evaluation
The DID evaluation of this accident scenario is documented in Tables 1,2 , and 3. The SAR analysis for this event meets the DID EG. Lower dose values are calculated (and are listed in Tables 1,2 , and 3) by crediting more realistic accident phenomena characteristics in addition to the SS and HA systems. The calculated medium dose is below the DID EG.
3.24
Building 232-H MTF Collapse with a Secondary Fire
Accident Description
The NPH events are common cause events and can effect the entire Tritiurn complex.
Only two types of NPH events of significance were identified, tornadoes and earthquakes.
Generally, two levels of damage are considered for each building, an unlikely event in which the hazard curve is integrated up to the design basis event but few serious secondary events occur, and an extremely unlikely event in which the design basis event is followed by secondary events such as tires.
The natural phenomena hazards were treated in a probabilistic manner for buildings 232-H and 234-H. The Building 233-H seismic scenarios are bounding scenarios that examine the maximum consequence if selected design features that mitigate the tritium release consequence in a seismic event are assumed to fail. Structural Engineering provided fragility vahres for the two buildings, significant equipment associated with the buildings, and the 295-H, 296-H, and 297-H stacks. The fragility values were input to a logic model for building and equipment failure. In addition, each darnage state was considered to have second~tires with a condition probability of less than 0.1. The secondf ires were assumed to be full area tires.
Defense-in-Depth Evaluation
The DID evaluation of this accident scenario is documented in Tables 1,2 , and 3. The SAR analysis for this event does not meet the DID EG. This event meets the DID EG by crediting the SC items and BE analysis as shown in Table 1 . Lower dose values are crdculated (and are listed in Tables 2 and 3 ) by crediting more realistic accident phenomena characteristics in addition to the SS and HA systems. The calculated medium dose is below the DID EG.
3.25
Building 232-H MTF Collapse, Failure of High Risk Process Tanks with a Seconda~Fire
WSRC.TR-99-OO079
* /~**L'
Accident Description
Section 3.24.1 contains a generic description of Tritium facility seismic events.
Defense-in-Depth Evaluation
The DID evaluation of this accident scenario is documented in Tables 1,2 , and 3. The SAR analysis for this event meets the DID EG. Lower dose values are calculated (and are listed in Tables 1,2 , and 3) by crediting more realistic accident phenomena characteristics in addition to the SS and HA systems. The calculated medium dose is below the DID EG. 
The DID evaluation of this accident scenario is docmnented in Tables 1,2 , and 3. The SAR analysis for this event meets the DID EG. Lower dose values are calculated (and are listed in Tables 1,2 , and 3) by crediting more realistic accident phenomena characteristics in addition to the SS and HA systems. The calctiated medium dose is below tie DID EG. Based on the recommendation of tie DID anrdysis Team, the following DID item is added: . Seismic Tritimn Cotilnement System (STCS). The functioning of this system in Building 233-H wodd preserve the National Resource Tritium and would minimize releases during a seismic event.
3.27
Building 233-H Evaluation basis Seismic Event, Followed by a Fire 3.27.1 Accident Description Section 3.24.1 contains a generic description of Tritium facility seismic events,
Defense-in-Depth Evaluation
The DID evaluation of this accident scenario is documented in Tables 1,2 , and 3. The SAR anrdysis for tis event does not meet the DID EG. This event meets the DID EG by crediting the SC items and BE analysis as shown in Tables 1,2 , and 3) by crediting more realistic accident phenomena characteristics in addition to the S S and HA systems. The calcdated medium dose is below the DID EG.
Building 234-H Buildlng Collapses, Followed by a Fire
Accident Description
Section 3.24.1 contains a generic description of Tritimn facility seismic events.
Defense-in-Depth Evaluation
The DID evaluation of this accident scenmio is documented in Tables 1,2 , and 3. The SAR analysis for this event does not meet the DID EG. This event meets the DID EG by crediting the SC items and BE analysis as shown in Table 1 . Lower dose values are calcdated (and are listed in Tables 2 and 3 ) by crediting more realistic accident phenomena characteristics in addition to tie SS and HA systems. The calculated medium dose is below the DID EG.
The compete list of SC, SS, and HA systems applicable to each accident is shown in Table 4 oftils report. The DID systems are shown in italics in Table 4 .
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
The estimated DID accident analysis doses are less than the DID Goal values. 
5.0
